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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
JESSUP THOMAS and IRENE THOMAS,
his wife; WILLIAM H. VAN TASSELL and
APHNE VAN TASELL, his wife; ORVEN J.
MOON and DELPHIA N. MOON, his wife;
and EDWIN CARMAN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

'

vs.
KARL V. KING, as Administrator of the Estate of HANNAH J. BRAFFET, Deceased;
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR., as Administrator
with the will annexed of the Estate of JOHN
MAXCY ZANE, Deceased; THE C0 NTINENTAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, as Administrator of the
Estate of DAVID G. SMITH, Deceased;
JUANITA G. SMITH, surviving wife of DAVID G. SMITH, Deceased; HELEN B.
MOTT; L. L. PACK and NO,RA E. PACK,
his wife; W. H. COLTHARP and ORAL
COLTHARP, his wife,
Defendants, Intervenors,
and Respondents.
1

CASE
~NO. 8519

RESPONDENTS• BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We agree generally with the Statement of Facts set
forth in appellants' brief, but we think it might be helpful
to further delineate them.
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In this ·action, as well as in the previous actions filed

by appellants against respondents, to which reference will
hereafter be made, appellants seek to quiet title to 600 acres
of desert land in Duchesne County, Utah. Mark P. Braffet
formerly owned this land, he being the grantee of the patentee. During his lifetime he conveyed to different parties
undivided interests in the land, the total of these grants
amounting to an undivided two-thirds interest. Among the
grantees was John M. Zane, to whom he conveyed an undivided one-sixth interest. Mark P. Braffet's wife, who
was then living, did not join in any of these conveyances.
The taxes were not paid by anyone, and in 1929 all the land
was sold for delinquent taxes. In 1945, Duchesne County
conveyed its interest to appellant Jessup Thomas, and in
the same year Maude Braffet White Waring, a daughter
of Mark P. Braffet, who had received a conveyance to said
property by a decree of distribution in the estate of Mark
P. Braffet, conveyed her interest to David G. Smith. Since
that time, Thomas and Smith have each conveyed part of
their interests, Thomas to the other named appellants and
Smith to Helen B. Mott, L. L. Pack and Horace Coltharp.
Hereafter, for the sake of brevity, when reference is made
to Smith and his three grantees, they will referred to as
the Smiths.
PLEADINGS
The complaint in this case is a short form seeking
merely to quiet title to 600 acres of land. There were a
number of defendants named in the complaint and summons, but service of summons was made only on the respondents David G. Smith, L. L. Pack, W. H. Coltharp and
their wives, and on Helen B. Mott.
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The complaint alleges that the respondents claim some
right, title and interest in the land described in the complaint, and the Smiths filed their answers, in which they
admitted the same, and in their prayer asked to have an
undivided one-third interest in the land quieted in them
subject to any right that Maude Braffet vVhite Waring
might have in the oil, gas and mineral rights. Karl V. King,
as administrator of the estate of Hannah J. Braffet, deceased, and Dallas H·. Young, Jr., as administrator with the
will ~nexed of the estate of John Maxcy Zane, deceased,
intervened in the case without objection on the part of the
appellants. We will make no further reference to the claim
made by Karl V. King as administrator of the estate of
Hannah J. Braffet, because the administrator has conceded
and the court has found that there \vas no basis for such
claim, and this issue is not before the Court.
In the motion of intervention filed by the administra-

tor of the John Maxcy Zane estate, the issue was raised as
to whether the dismissal of the actions against the Zane
estate operated as an adjudication upon the merits.
The defenses interposed by the s.miths and the motion
filed by intervenor Zane are different, but for sake of convenience the cases were consolidated for trial. The case
was tried on the complaint of the appellants, the answer of
the Smiths, and the motion of the intervenors. Appellants
did not plead the statute of limitations. Counsel for appellants and respondents and the court, on the trial of the case
and in all briefs which were submitted by counsel for each
of the parties, proceeded as though the statute had been
pleaded and as though a plea in avoidan~ce had been interposed by the respondents Smiths.
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The case was first heard on the 26th day of April, 1954,
and the court found the issues in favor of the Smiths and
the two intervenors. Later -counsel for respondents informed the court that they were of the opinion that the
judgment in favor of the administrator of the Hannah J.
Braffet estate could not be sustained, and the court granted a new trial as to all parties. The trial from which this
appeal is taken was heard on the 25th day of April, 1955,
and at the commencement of the trial, appellants filed what
they denominated a reply to respondents' answers.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE F AlLURE OF THE DUCHESNE COUNTY AUDITO'R TO ATTACH HIS AFFIDAVIT TO THE ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE YEAR 1929 VOIDED THE TAX
SALE MADE BY DUCHESNE COUNTY.
POINT II
THE EVEDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF
THE COURT THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
UPON WHICH APPELLANTS RELIEID, WAS TOLLED
BY THE FILING OF CIVIL ACTION NO. 2693 AND THE
ANSWER AND APPEARANCE OF THE RESPONDE'NT SMITHS IN SAID ACTION FROM JULY 27, 1951
TO JUNE 23, 1952 AND BY THE FILING O~F CIVIL ACTION NO. 2764 AND THE ANSWER AND APPEARANCE O·F THE RESPONDENTS SMITH IN SAID ACTl!ON FROM JUNE 25, 1952 UNTIL THE PRESENT
TIME.
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POINT ill
THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW SUPPORT THE
FINDING O·F THE COURT THAT THE DISMISSAL O~F
CIVIL ACTIONS NOS. 2663, 269·3 AND 2674 WAS AN
ADJUDICATION UPO·N THE MERITS AS FAR AS THE
ESTATE ·O'F JOHN MAXCY ZANE, DE·CEASED, IS
CONCERNED.
POINT IV
THE ESTATE O·F HANNAH J. BRAFFET, iDECEASED, HAS NO RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST IN
THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE COMPLAINT AND
IN THE FINDiNGS O·F FACT.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE FAILURE O~F THE DUCHESNE COUNTY AUDIT01R TO ATT.A:CH HIS AFFID·AVIT TO THE ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE YEAR 1929 V:OIDED THE TAX
SALE MADE BY DUCHESNE CO,UNTY.
The stipulation entered into between appellants and
respondents in open court shows that the auditor's affidavit was not attached to the assessment roll for the year
1929. Under the rule laid down in the case of Telonis. v.
Staley, 114 .Utah 537, 144 Pac. 2d 513, the tax title received
by appellants is void.
Our Supreme Court has stated that in an action to
quiet title, plaintiff must succeed by virtue of the strength
of his own title and not by the weakness of the defendants'
title. Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 Pac. 2d 862.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF
TH'E C 0URT THAT THE STATl.ITE OF LIMITATIONS,
UPO,N WHICH APPELLANTS RELIED, WAS TOLLED
BY THE FILING OF CIVIL ACTION NO. 2693 AND THE
ANSWE.R AND APPEARANCE OF THE RESPONDENT SMITHS IN SAID ACTIO·N FROM JULY 27, 1951
TO JUNE 23, 1952 AND BY THE FILING OF CIVIL ACTION NO. 2764 AND THE ANSWER AND APPEARAN~CE OIF THE RESPONDENTS SMITH IN S.AliD ACTION FROM JUNE 25, 1952 UNTIL THE PRESENT
TIME.
1

We now direct our remarks to the question as to
vvhether the statute of limitations has been tolled, but in
reciting the evidence relating to this question, reference
of necessity will . have to be made to evidence which also
applies to the Zane estate.
The record shows that the appellants filed their first
action against the Smiths and the other respondent in the
District c·ourt of the Fourth Judicial District in Duchesne
County on May 22, 1946, Civil No. 2263. The S~th interests appeared in said action through Mr. Henry Ruggeri
of Pri~ce, Utah. On the lOth day of October, 1949, the attorney for the appellants moved that the action be dismissed. Upon said motion the action was dismissed. Again
on June 23, 1952, the firm of Stanley and- Lewis moved the
court for dismissal of the same case, and order for dismissal was signed by the court.
On July 27, 1951, Civil Action No. 2693 was filed by
the appellants against all the respondents named in the
present action. To this complaint the Smith interests filed
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an answer on August 20, 1951. On May 3, 1952, appellants
filed what. they denominated a ·reply to this answer, and
on June 23, 1952, the attorneys for appellants moved· the
court for an order dismissing the action without prejudice,
and on said day the action was dismissed.
Two days thereafter, to-wit: June 25, 1952, the same
appellants filed Civil Action No. 2764, the present action,
against the respondents named in the actions theretofore
dismissed. Pursuant to stipulation, attorneys for the Smith
interests entered their appearance. On the 14th day of
Septe1nber, 1953, attorneys for appellants and the Carter
Oil Company moved to dismiss the action as to all respondents, except the Smith interests. The motion to dismiss
was granted.
As to the Smiths, the trial court found that the commencement of Civil Action No. 2693 by the appellants and
the answer of the Smiths tolled the statute of limitations
from July 27, 1951, until it ·was dimsissed on June 23, 1952,
and that the filing of Civil Action No. 2764 on June 25, 1952
and the filing of the answer by the Smith respondents has
tolled the action since that time.
The general principle of law is that the filing of a ·complaint tolls the statute of limitations. In support of this
proposition, we quote from Am. Juris., Vol. 34, Section
247, page 202:
"It is a firmly established rule that the commencement of suit prior to the expiration of the applicable
limitation period interrupts the running of the statute
of li-mitations as to all parties to the action and their
privies, not only as to causes of action set forth in the
complaint or petition, but also as to all defenses which
may :be interposed ·by the defendant. And by applic
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cation of the principle, when, by amendment to the
pleadings in a pending action, a person is brought into
that action as· an additional party defendant, the statute of limitations ceases to run as to him from that
time. Lapse of time cannot be relied upon to bar a
suit in equity which is auxiliary to an action already
commenced at law, if the latter was brought within
the time limited.
"The bringing ·by a claimant in adverse possession
of land, of an action involving title thereto which is
based on the existence of a right in another is such a
recognition of that right as will arrest the running of
the statute of limitaions in favor of the occupant and
against such right. However, it is only as to the right
claimed by the defendant in an action by the claimant
in possession that the running of the statute is arrested."
As authority for the last sentence, the case of Weiner
v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 Pac. 490, is cited. Counsel for
appellants, in his brief, states that the Weiner v. Steams
case, (supra) is directly in point on the question as to
whether the statute was tolled by the filing of Civil Action
No. 2693. Because the facts are different in the Weiner
v. Stearns case (supra) , we do not think the case is squarely in point, but we do believe that the rationale contained
therein sustains the position reached by the trial court in
this case. We think a recital of the facts in the Weiner v.
Stearns case (supra) may be of assistance to the Court.
Weiner purchased certain lots in Salt Lake County in
1898, the lots having been sold for taxes, and took possession thereof in 1899. He enclosed the lots within a fence
and made other improvements thereon. In November, 1903,
Weiner commenced an action against Amanda Stearns, she
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being the owner of the lots at the time they were sold to
Salt Lake County for delinquent taxes, to quiet title to the
lots. The District C'ourt of Salt Lake ~county entered a decree quieting title to the lots in Weiner. Subsequently,. Mrs.
Stearns conveyed her interest to Addison Cain and Cain
conveyed his interest to Peter Borg. Borg filed suit to set
aside the decree obtained by Weiner, and in 1906 the decree was set aside. In 1910, Weiner started an action to
quiet title, alleging that he was the owner of the property
by reason of adverse possession for more than seven years
and the payment of taxes for that period. Borg's defense
was that the seven year period had been interrupted by
filing of the action by Weiner in 1903. The lower court
held with Borg. The Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's decision, and in discussing the question as to whether
the seven year period of limitation has been arrested, states
as follows:
"We confess our inability to understand how the
bringing of an action by appellant, without any appearance by the defendant or any claim adverse to his
rights, could have such effect. No doubt, if, afte~r inviting Almanda Stearns into court, she had appeared
in the action, and had disputed appellant's title, the
nmning of the statute, for the purpose of that action
at least, would have been arrested. It is not true that
the commencement of an action, under all circumstances, arrests the running of the statute of limitations.
It is settled law that in case new parties are brought
into a pending action as defendants, the statute of limitations runs in their favor up to the time they are
brought into the case." (Emphasis ours)
In the Weiner v. Stearns case (supra), the purchaser
at the tax sale filed his complaint naming the record owner
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.as party defendant, but no proper service was ever made
upon her. Weiner had been in possession of the property
for a number of years. In this case the court found that
appellants had not been in possession. In the Weiner case
no appearance was made by the defendant. In the present
case the Smiths appeared and filed their answer asking that
title be quieted in them, so that the rationale as set forth
in the Weiner v. Stearns case (supra) , clearly sustains the
decision reached by the trial court. We submit that the
position of the respondents is the same as though they had
initiated the action and had joined the appellants as party
defendants. Had this procedure been followed, could anyone seriously contend that the statute was not tolled?
Again adverting to appellants' contention that Civil
Action No. 2693 was erroneously admitted ·because the respondents Smiths had not made a plea in avoidance of the
statute of limitations, ·we call attention to the fact that appellants never raised this question of limitations except by
a pleading which they tenned as a reply filed at the commencement of the last trial. We understand the purpose
of reply is to deny new matters raised in the answers, and
respondents raised no .matters in their answer which required a reply.
Respondents do not seek to take advantage of the fact
that appellants never properly pleaded the statute of limitations, but we assert that appellants are in no position under the record to raise the objection that respondents failed
to make a plea of avoidance. In support of our position,
respondents call attention to Rule 7 (a), U. R. C. P., which
reads as follows:
"Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an
answer; and there shall be a reply to a counterclaim

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the
answer contains a cross-claim; a third party complaint,
if leave is given under Rule 14 to summon a person
who was not an original party; and there shall be a
third party answer, if a third party complaint is served.
No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court
may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer."
We also invite the Court's attention to Rule 8, (d) and
(f), U. R. C. P.:

''(d) Effect of Failure to 1Deny. Averments in
a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required,
other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading.
Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied
or avoided.''
"(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."
POINT ill
THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW SUPPORT THE
FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE DISMISSAL O'F
CIVIL ACTIONS NOS. 2663, 2693 AND 2674 WAS AN
ADJUDICATION UPOIN THE MERITS AS FAR AS THE
ESTATE OF JOHN MAXCY ZANE, DECEASED, IS
CONCERNED~

The facts are not in dispute that in all actions filed ~by
plaintifs in which they sought to quiet title to the land in
question, the same land is described, and John M. Zane and
his heirs were named as party defendants. The facts are
also not in dispute that Civil Action No. 2263 was, by the
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plaintiffs, dismissed either in 1949 or in 1952. There is no
question that Civil Action No. 2692 was dismissed on June
23, 1952, and that Civil Action No. 2764, as to Zanes, was
dismissed on September 14, 1953.
Counsel for appellants contends that these actions were
dismised by the court and not by the appellants. For the
Court's convenience we set forth Rule 41 (a) (1), U. R.
C. P.:
"Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule
66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court
(i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the
notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by
a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the
United States or of any state an action based on or
including the same claim."
This rule, which became effective January 1, 1950, has
not been interpreted, so far as we know, by any of the
western states. We believe the case of Robertshaw-Fulton
Controls Company v. Noma Electric Corporation, reported
in 10 F. R. D. 32, sets forth the law which applies in this
case. This case was decided January 23, 1950, and the action arose in the United Staes District Court, Department
of Maryland. We quote the applicable portions of the
court's opinion:
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"The material facts are as follows: On November
5, 1948, the plaintiff, a Delaware Corporation, filed suit
in this court against the defendant, a Maryland corporation, seeking a declaratory judgment .
with respect to the rights of plaintiff and defendant in
certain patents
Previously, that is, on September 7, 1948, plaintiff had filed a similar suit in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York
against another, the parent company, bearing the same
name but incorporated under the laws of New York.
This suit had been brought under the belief that the
New York corporation and not the Maryland corporation owned the patents involved. However, upon being
informed to the contrary, plaintiff brought suit in this
court against the Maryland corporation and shortly
thereafter, that is, on November 18, 1948, dismissed
the New York action.
on July 22, plaintiff filed notice of dis"
missal of the present suit, this notice stating that 'pursuant to the provisions of Rule 41 (a); plaintiff hereby
dismisses the above-entitled case without prejudice and
without costs. Two days earlier, that is, on July 20,
1949, plaintiff had instituted another suit against the
New York Corporation in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York on the same claim.
Thereupon, on August 3, defendant filed a motion in
the proceeding in this Court to strike out plaintiff's
notice of dismissal of July 22, or, in the alternative, for
an order dismissing the action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 (a). !Defendant has also filed a similar
motion in the third suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York seeking dismissal of
that suit on the ground that plaintiff having dismissed
the first suit brought in that court, its filing of the notice of dismissal in the suit in this, the Maryland District Court, amounts to an adjudication on the merits
under Rule 41 (a). The motion in the District Court
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in New York came on for hearing on October 25, 1949,
but after arguments of counsel thereon, the Court declined to dispose of the matter pending a decision on
the similar motion filed in this Court. On December
8, plaintiff filed in this Court notice of withdrawal of
its notice of dismissal of its suit filed on July 22, defendant's motion filed August 3 having already been
set for hearing on the. following day, December 9.
"At the hearing of defendant's motion which, as
above stated, was framed in the alternative, namely,
that (1) plaintiff's notice, filed July 22, of its dismissal
of the present suit be struck out or (2) that this notice
of dismissal be declared to operate as an adjudication
on the merits and that the dismissal was therefore with
prejudice, defendant insisted that it was entitled to an
order of this Court to the latter effect.
"After full consideration
The Court
reaches the conclusion that de~ndant's position is correct and that, therefore, it is entitled to an order dismissing the present action with prejudice.
''We find no ambiguity in the words employed in
Rule 41(a) and we have no doubt that the Rule applies
to the present situation. This part of the Rule relates
to voluntary dismissal of actions, that is, by plaintiff
or by stipulation, without order of Court. After describing the two ways in which such dismissal may
take place, namely, (1) by filing a notice of dismissal
at any time before service by the adverse party of an
answer or of a motion for summary judgment; whichever first· occurs, or ( 2) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action, the Rule provides that 'Unless otherwise stated
in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal
is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal
ope~rates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed
by a plaintiff who has once dis~ in any court of
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the United States or of any state an action based on or
including the same claim.' (Emphasis supplied). It is
clear from this language that the plaintiff in the present case could not, by the mere recital in its notice of
dismissal of July 22, 1949, that such notice is 'without
prejudice and without costs,' defeat the express language of the Rule above quoted. The present plaintiff
had, prior to July 22, 1949, that is, on November 19,
1948, dismissed that action which it had filed in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York
'based on or including the same claim' as that involved
in the present suit in this court."
Another case in point is that of I-Iineline v. Minneapolis
Honeywell Regulator Company, 78 F. 2d 854. The Federal
c·ourt in that case was required to interpret a Minneapolis
statute, the state court having failed to rule upon the matter before the Federal Court. The section from the statute
requiring interpretation reads as follows:
"An action may be dismissed, without a final determination of its merits, in the following cases:
'1. By the plaintiff at any time before the trial
begins, if a provisional remedy has not been allowed,
or a counterclaim made or other affirmative relief de'""
manded in the answer: Provided, that an action on
the same cause of action against any defendant shall
not be dismissed more than once without the written
consent of the defendant or an order of the court on
notice and cause shown;"
The aRpellant, Hineline, brought an action against the
Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Company in the State
Court to recover for services alleged to have been rendered
that company at its request. The action was removed to
the United States District Court for the District of Minne-
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apolis because of diversity of citizenship. The case was set
down for trial. At the time appointed for the trial, plaintiff
stated he was not ready for trial and could not proceed.
Defendant moved for dismissal and, by order of the court,
the case was dismissed without prejudice. Later, plaintiff
commenced another action on the same cause of action, in
the same State Court against the same defendant. The case
was also transferred to the Federal Court. The issues were
joined and the case was set fo rtrial. The defendants prepared for trial and four days before the case was to be
heard, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice of his action. Upon motion of the defendant,
the notice to dismiss was stricken and the court ordered
the trial to be heard on the date first fixed. On the date
of the trial, it was discovered that the plaintiff had filed
another like notice of dismissal without prejudice. The
court called the case for trial. The plaintiff did not appear.
On motion of the defendant the second notice of dismissal
was stricken from the files. The court directed a verdict
and ordered judgments for the defendants for their costs.
From that judgment the appeal was taken. We quote from
the court's opinion:
"The plaintiff contends that he had the absolute
right to arbitrarily dismiss without prejudice his second case, and that he did so, but that, even if it should
be held that he did not or could not voluntarily so dismiss, nevertheless the court was without power to dispose of the case upon its merits in -his absence. The
defendants contend that the plaintiff had no right to
arbitrarily dismiss, without prejudice, his second case,
and that the precedure adopted by the court below was
prope~r.''
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The court stated:
"The statute, (supra), grants the plaintiff, frequently to the prejudice and much at the expense of
the defense, the indulgence of one arbitrary dismissal.
. It thus appears that a plaintiff who has enjoyed his one arbitarary dismissal and has recommenced his action is then substantially in the same position as one against whom a provisional remedy has
been allowed, a counterclaim made, or affirmative relief demanded in the answer. Walker v. St. Paul City
Ry. Co., 52 Minn. 127, 130, 53 N. W. 1068. He has an
action which he cannot dismiss except upon its merits
unless for cause shown or by consent of the defendant."
Quoting further:
"We are satisfied that, under the practice in Minnesota, when a plaintiff who has lost his right to dismiss without prejudice, and who, under the pleadings,
has the burden of proof, fails or refuses to proceed to
trial, the proper course for the court to ·pursue is to
enter a judgment of dismissal of the case with prejudice."
Taking the testimony in the light most favorable to
appellants, there have been three dismisals against the
John M. Zane estate, one of which would be prior to January 1, 1950, when Rule 41 (a) was adopted. There are authorities which hold that eve nthough one or more of the
dismissals had been made prior to the adoption of the Rule,
a dismisal subsequent to the adoption of the Rule operates
as an adjudication upon the merits.
We call attention to the case of Cleveland Trust Company v. Osher and Reiss, 31 F. Supp. 985, and particularly
page 1009. This is a patent infringement suit involving
many patents, all of which bear different names, and the
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Court, in its opinion, treats the facts and the law as to each
patent separately. Among the patents was the Aldrich
Patent and in this case there had been two dismissals prior
to the adoption of Rule 41 (a) and none thereafter. Nevertheless, the defendant contended that the second dismissal
operated as an adjudication upon the merits. The court
said:
''There cannot be a dismissal on the merits unless
subsequent to the date the rule went into effect a notice of dismissal was given."
The court further stated:
"The prior dismissals gave the opportunity to
make the rule effective, if, subsequent to the effective
date of the rule the notice was given. This does not
change the effect of the action of the plaintiff in dismissing the action prior to the effective date of the
Rule, but would make the notice given subsequent to
the effective date of the rule a voluntary action on the
part of the moving party, with notice, on which the rule
would be applied.
"No notice of dismissal after the rule went into
effect was given, but the action was brought on for
trial and that motion is denied."
The -court then discusses what is termed the Frenier
Patent, and the defendant asked in that case that the suit
be dismissed on the merits. The facts show that there was
a dismissal prior to the Rule taking effect and one after the
Rule went into effect. The court held that the second dismissal was on the merits. The court states:
''The purpose of Rule 41 was to prevent the delays
in litigation by numerous dismissals without prejudice."
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As we understand appellants' position it is that the dismissals made by appellants against the Zane estate do not
fall within Rule 41 (a) because (1) they were dismissals
made by the court, and (2) that when the Zane estate made
a motion asking that the court find that the second dismissal was an adjudication upon the merits, that the case was
reinstated as far as the Zane estate is concerned. We shall
first discuss proposition (1).
There is no question under the record that the Zane
estate had never served an answer or motion for summary
judgment prior to the time of the dismissals, and there had
been no stipulation for dismissal. Further, there is no dispute that all dismissals were made upon motion of the attorneys for appellants. True it is that the court granted
the Jnotion made by appellants. The question is then posed,
could the attorney for appellants circumvent the nlle of
law by proceeding as he did?
We do not know what impelled counsel for appellants
to dismiss the cases in the mannar in which they were dismissed. It may be that counsel was not familiar with Ru1e
41 (a) , or, being familiar, may have .forgotten the effect
thereof, but assuming the facts most favorable to appellants, let us assume counsel was familiar with the rule and
purposely followed the procedure which was followed. That
can avail him nothing because he, as well as the courts, are
bound by the rules.of law and procedure the same as litigants, and what the court did in this case cannot have the
effect of bringing the dismissals under paragraph 2 of Rule
41. Appellants and their counsel are charged with notice
of the law and in this case no responsive pleading had been
filed by the Zane estate, and the dismissals were under Rule
41 (a).
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Rule 41 is discussed in Barron and Holtzoff's Federal
Practice and Procedure, volume 2, page 614 and following.
At page 615, note 14, the following appears: "Under Rule
41 (a), plaintiff's right to dismiss generally, before service
of answer or of motion for summary judgment is absolute,
and is accomplished merely by filing of notiee of dismissal,
although after such service plaintiff may not dismiss except upon order of court and upon such terms as court
deems proper. Wilson and Co. v. Fremont Cake and Meal
Co., D. C. Neb. 1949, 83 F. Supp. 900." Other cases are
cited to the same effect.
For a dismissal to be operative tmder Rule 41(a) (1)
it need not apply to all of the defendants. A second dismissal against some but not all of the defendants operates
as an adjudication upon the merits so far as those defendants against whom there is a second dismissal are concerned.
Friedman v. Washburn Co., 145 F2d 715, at pages 718-19.
The notice of dismissal provided by Rule 41 (a) (1) is
new to our practice. Notice of such dismissal need not be
given. The notice is merely filed in the action by the plaintiff. "The plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal before
the service of an answer or motion for summary judgment
need only be filed with the clerk and is not required to be
served on the other parties. It is merely a notice and not
a motion, although a notice in the form of a motion has
been held sufficient for the purpose.'' Barron and Holtzoff,
Federal p·ractice and Procedure, volume 2, page 618; Silver
v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, D. C. Conn. 1948,
80 F. Supp. 541.
On the facts of this case·, the appellants had the absolute right to dismiss against the Zane interests.
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The gist of the argument of appellants is that the ru1es
may be circumvented by failing to comply with them. It
is to be noted that there is no provision in Rule 41 (a) which
allows the court to make an order of dismissal where the
defendant has not answered or filed a motion for summary
judgment. The recitals in the orders of dismissal that the
dismissals are without prejudice cannot be of significance.
If it were otherwise, then the parties and the court may
defeat the operation of the rules by placing something in
the order of the court contrary to the provisions of the rules.
As \Ve have pointed out, the dismissals, if they are effective
against the Zane estate, must have been n1ade pursuant to
Rule 41 (a) (1) . ''A recital in the motion of dismissal of a
second action that it is without prejudice does not prevent
its operation as an adjudication upon the merits." Page
146 of the 1954 Pocket Supplement to Barron & Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure; Robertshow-Fulton Controls Co. v. Noma Electric Corp., (supra).
In support of what we have just said, we invite attention to the case of White v. Thompson, 80 F. Supp. 41~.
The facts in the case are very brief. This was an action
against a railroad, and the railroad made a motion to dismiss on two grounds. First, that the prosecution of the
case in any other location outside the State of Arkansas
constituted an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce, and second, that the prosecution in the Federal c~ourt
of illinois vv-as inconvenient, inequitable~, burdensome and
oppressive to the defendant. The court granted defendant's motion ordering the case transferred to Arkansas.
Within the ten day period limited in the court's memorandum, the parties simultaneously presented motions. The
plaintiff move the court to dismiss the case without preju-
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dice. The defendant moved the eourt to transfer the case
to Arkansas. It was the contention of the defendant that
the dismissal should be upon terms, and was under paragraph 2 of Ru1e 41. We quote from the court's opinion:
"The plaintiff has moved the court to dismiss the
cause and, the~fore, shou1d, it is assumed, be held
to be a proceeding under Ruie 41 (a) (2). But, upon
considerations 9f the question as to what "terms and
conditions" should be imposed on the dismissal, it is
proper that the court consider the terms of Rule 41 (a)
(1). No answer has been filed in this case, neither has
a motion for summary judgment been filed. Therefore,
the plaintiff probably had the right to file a notice of
dismissal under Rule 41 (a) (1). Since he had this
right, it seems to the court that ''terms and conditions
should not be imposed upon the dismissal. Accordingly, the motion of the plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice, at plaintiff's costs, will be granted. An order
to that effect has this day been made."
Under the title "C. Evidence," appellants' brief, appellants contend that the court erred in admitting Civil Action 2693 because "it is not within the issues of the case",
and secondly, ''there is no pleading to warrant introduction
of the file in this case." There are at least three reasons
why there is no merit to this contention: (1) The Rules
of Civil Procedure do not require one to · plead evidence.
We pleaded more than was necessary \vhen we pleaded the
dismissal of Civil Action Nos. 2693 and 2764 as to the Zane
estate; (2) 'The pleadings fully advised appellants of the
Zane defense; and (3) We believe that under the rules
and under the decided cases, we were not requird to file
any pleadings on behalf of the Zane estate, and that it was
not necessary fo\f appellants to be present to authorize the
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court to enter judgment on the merits against appellants.
When the second dismissal was made, the case against
the Zane estate was terminated, and there was nothing for
the court to do but enter judgment in favor of the estate.
There v1as nothing appellants or the court could do to revive the action.
POINT IV
THE ESTATE OF HANNAH J. BRAFFET, ,DECEASED, HAS NO RIGHT, TITLE O·R INTEREST IN
THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE COMPLAINT AND
IN THE FI1\l"DINGS OF FACT.
The propositions posed by Points I\7" and V of appellants' brief is illustrative of the dilemma with which the
respondents \Vere confronted during all of these proceedings. The contentions made by appellants are not new.
They were urged upon the trial court in the first briefs submitted by appellants. The trial court, wisely, in our opinion, failed to make any findings or conclusions respecting
appellants' contentions. There is absolutely no pleading by
any of the parties which raise these issues. It is true that
the question has been raised by appellants in their briefs
and that we filed briefs answering those contentions. We
did this for the same reason that we never made any issue
of the fact that appellants had not pleaded the statute of
limitations, the reasons being that we felt that we had a deof limitations was concerned
fense so far as the statute
,.
and that there was nothing to appellants' contention regarding the propositions raised in Points IV and V. However, appellants having raised the issue again, we again
deem it necessary to make a short reply thereto.
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First, we submit that if the Smiths are barred by the
statute of limitations, they do not care who is the owner
of the land in question. On the other hand, if the Court
holds that the decision of the lower court should be affirmed as to the Smiths, it can be of no concern to the appellants what are the respective rights of the Smiths and
Maude White Waring.
S~cond, appellants are attempting to make a collateral
attack upon a decree of the Seventh Judicial District Court
of Carbon County entered in that court on August 10, 1927,
without any pleadings of any kind raising that issue. (See
Plaintiff's Exhibit C for Decree of Distribution, pages 148152).
Third, assuming for the sake of the discussion, that
appellants had, by proper pleading and process, joined the
Hannah J. Braffet estate and the three children of Mark
P. Braffet in this case, the law will not support appellants'
contentions. Appellants cannot be in a more favorable position to attack the De·cree of Distribution entered in the
Mark P. Braffet estate than Hannah J. Braffet would be
if she were living. Plaintiffs' Exhibit C, page--~-·--f-(_ __
shows that Mark P. Braffet left an estate having an appraised value of more than $41,000.00, the real estate having an appraised value of more than $28,000.00, and the
value of the p·roperty in litigation was fixed at $150.00. The
appraised value of the property distributed to Hannah J.
Braffet was real property $17,600.00, and personal property $3-,900.00.
There was distributed to Maude White Waring property having a total appraised value of $3,900.00. The other
property was distributed to the two sons of the Braffets.
All of the property was distributed in accordance with the
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petition filed with the court, the contents of which Hannah
J. Braffet and the children approved. This is shown by
Plaintiffs' Exhibit C, pages 103 to 111.
It is evident in this case that the widow and her children entered into an agreement for the division of the property left to them upon the death of Mark P. Braffet, and
that the court, pursuant to that agreement, distributed the
property in question to Maude White Waring. We submit
that all of the courts give effect to family agreements unless there is fraud in connection therewith. Authorities
for this proposition will be found in Vol. 4 of Bancroft's
Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, Seetion 1150, page 444.
Among the cases cited therein is one from c~alifornia, in Re
Howe Estate, 199 P. 2d 59:
"Stipulations concerning the amount to be considered community property and to determine the widow's share thereof, ifnot illegal or contrary to policy,
are not only approved by ·the law but the courts seek
to sustain rather than overturn such compromise measures.''
This question is annotated in A. L. R. and the most recent cases we have found therein are those cited in 54 A.
L. R. 976. Among the cases cited is the case from Georgia
reported in 134 S. E., 194; in which it was held that an
agreement between the widow and the heirs of an estate
that she take a stipulated portion of the estate in lieu of
her rights as a widow, including the provisions for an heir's
support, would be upheld against her later repudiation in
the absence of the showing of fraud or mistake.
"An agreement between the widow, heirs, next
of kin, all being adults, as to certain matters in the
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settlement of an intestate's estate, was held to be a
valid and binding agreement." 207 S. W. 209.
"The law looks with favor on family compromises
or agreements or the settlement of intestates' estates
and when no right of creditors intervenes, such agree-'
ments if free fro mfraud, are upheld and enforced by
the courts." 176 N. W. 547.
"The law favors compromises and settlements
among the heirs, distributees, devisees and legatees of
the decedent's estate and will enforce such agreements
when made between persons having the legal capacity
to contract." 21 A. J. Sec. 21, page 381.
Also, see 16 Am. Jur., Sec. 145, page 925.
A compromise and settlement among heirs, distributees,
devisees and legatees of an intestate's estate, where free
from fraud, are favored and enforcd by the law subject to
the rights of creditors. Citing a case from Georgia, 178 S.
E .. 52, we quote from the syllabus:
"Where consent division of an estate has been
made between distributees, each distributee ipso facto
acquires a perfect equity in the property set apart to
him and loses all interest in that assigned to the other
distributees. ''
Another case cited is from Kansas, Riffe v. Walton, 182
Pac. 640. We quote from that case:
"No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the widow and the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for the distribution of an estate
on a plan different from that prescribed by the statutes on descents and distributions."
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CONCLUSIONS
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed for
the following reasons:
(1) The failure of the Duchesne County Auditor to
attach his affidavit to the assessment roll for the year 1929
voided the tax sale made by Duchesne County.
(2) The statute of limitations upon which appellants
rely was tolled by the filing of Civil Actions Nos. 2693 and
2764.
(3) The dismissal by appellants of Civil Actions Nos.
2663, 2693 and 2764 as to the John l'ilaxcy Zane estate operated as an adjudication upon the merits. The dismissal

of these actions upon motion of appellants were disr.oissals
under Rule 41(a).
(4) Maude Braffet White Vvaring acquired a onethird interest in the 600 acres of land in question under the
Decree of Distribution in the Mark P. Braffet es.tate, and
appellants' att~mpted collateral attack upon the Smiths'
title is a nullity and of no effect.
Respectfully submitted,
DA.LLAS H. YOUNG,

YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN,
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
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